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A B S T R A C T   
The domain name system (DNS) is an Internet network service that is used by hosts to resolve IP addresses from 
symbolic names. This basic service has been attacked and abused many times, as it is one of the oldest and most 
vulnerable services on the Internet. Some DNS resolvers conduct DNS manipulation, in which authoritative DNS 
responses are modified. This DNS manipulation is sometimes used for legitimate reasons (e.g., parental control) 
and other times is used to support malicious activities, such as DNS poisoning or data collection. Between these 
DNS manipulation activities, some Internet service providers (ISPs) are changing the DNS cache timeout of the 
DNS responses with which their DNS resolvers responded to obtain additional data about their subscribers. These 
data can be a detailed web browsing profile of the user. This approach does not require a large investment and 
can yield huge benefits if the information is used or sold. Therefore, user privacy is disputed. We conducted a 
study in which we analyse how ISPs use this DNS manipulation, propose a method for identifying this DNS 
manipulation by the end-user and determine the amount of information an ISP can collect by using it. We also 
developed a public web tool, for which the source code is available, that can help Internet users determine 
whether their privacy is being compromised by their ISP via the exploitation of DNS cache timeouts. This service 
can facilitate the collection of data on how many people are victims of this abuse and which ISPs around the 
world are utilizing this technique.   
1. Introduction 
The domain name system (DNS) provides a fundamental service to 
Internet users, as it provides mappings from fully qualified domain 
names (FQDNs) to numerical IP addresses. These mappings are a 
necessary link that connects human users to the routing information of 
the Internet. Standards such as DNSsec and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) 
(Osterweil et al., 2007; Szalachowski and Perrig, 2017; Dickinson, 2020; 
Lian et al., 2013) have been developed for securing this protocol. 
However, DNSsec only provides trust in DNS information, and messages 
are not ciphered. With DoH, messages are ciphered, but its use remains 
anecdotal (Lu et al., 2019). Maintaining the DNS as it was 40 years ago 
renders it vulnerable to abuses and attacks (Klein and Pinkas, 2019; 
Zhao et al., 2007; Pearce et al., 2017) and provides internet service 
providers (ISPs) with requested DNS domains, which they can exploit to 
obtain data regarding the actions their clients perform using their 
Internet service. For example, an end-user who is browsing the Internet 
will request the DNS resolution of all the DNS domains of the visited web 
pages. 
Most Internet traffic is ciphered (Torres et al., 2017) (for example, 
using secure web browsing with HTTPS). Therefore, deep packet in-
spection does not provide much information to ISPs. Some information 
can still be obtained from un-encrypted headers, for example the 
internet protocol address of the accessed servers, however, capturing 
and processing tens or hundreds of gigabits per second present in ISP 
trunks is highly costly or even unfeasible (Moreno et al., 2015). The DNS 
service becomes a weak point that can be exploited by ISPs to obtain as 
much information as possible about the browsing patterns of their 
subscribers. We have confirmed the existence of ISPs that utilize this 
type of practice. ISPs own the local DNS, which is configured by default 
for their subscribers by the DHCP (dynamic host configuration proto-
col). That local DNS is responsible for resolving all DNS requests sent by 
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subscribers; therefore, it is the point at which the DNS responses can be 
easily modified by the ISP. 
The TTL (time-to-live) field of DNS responses is used to realize 
scalability, as it enables the caching of FQDN information by an inter-
mediate name server or user host, thereby preventing the host from 
needing to query constantly the authoritative name servers. This TTL 
controls the update frequency of the DNS records. Do not confuse this 
TTL field with the field of the same name in the IP header. Increasing 
TTL is being used by traffic control tools (Drako, 2013), and its use has 
been studied for additional applications in mobile environments (Wu 
et al., 2007), in order to reduce server load. Otherwise, decreasing TTL 
can be used by ISPs without the user’s awareness to extract more in-
formation about browsing habits, as the user has accepted these condi-
tions in the contract with his ISP. Reducing the TTL value of a DNS 
response does not substantially affect the Internet latency (Bhatti and 
Atkinson, 2011), and it does not significantly increase the load for DNS 
servers (Jung et al., 2002). This behaviour of ISPs has not been exposed 
in the literature before, and of course, ISPs do not expose publicly what 
they are doing and why. The only explanation for the modification of 
TTLs from ISPs that we have found is that it allows them to obtain many 
more samples of DNS requests from their subscribers. Changing the DNS 
settings to another DNS server in the client side is not a valid solution for 
preventing ISPs from collecting information by reducing the TTL of the 
DNS responses because ISPs can inspect DNS queries to third-party DNS 
servers and interfere with their responses (DNS transparent proxy). 
Therefore users are disabled from taking measures to prevent the ISP 
from compromising their privacy. 
By reducing the TTL of DNS responses, ISPs are requiring the client to 
make more DNS requests, and these DNS request can be used by the ISP 
to identify, with higher temporal granularity, the sites that their sub-
scribers are browsing. For example, for the domain booking.com (an 
important travel and reservations web site), the TTL is 86,400; hence, a 
DNS request would be conducted every 24 h. By modifying the TTL to 
60 s, a DNS request will be conducted every minute, which enables ISPs 
to obtain a better web browsing profile of the user. It is well-know that 
ISPs are using DNS traffic to make this profiling and that they do not 
agree with migrating to secure DNS proposals that would block the ac-
tivity (Ma et al., 2015). The manipulation of TTL can improve this 
profiling in a very significate way. 
Although tools are available that can help advanced users identify 
DNS servers that manipulate DNS answers to prevent possible attacks 
(Trevisan et al., 2017), no practical and easy-to-use tool is available that 
enables regular Internet users to identify possible abuses that involve 
DNS manipulation. To satisfy this need, we developed a web tool, 
namely DNSPrivacyTester1, that can identify possible abuses that 
involve DNS manipulation not only from ISP DNS resolvers but also from 
any other resolver that might be changing the TTL values of DNS re-
sponses to attack users and violate their privacy. The results demon-
strate that it is possible to identify DNS manipulation using the user web 
browser with high accuracy in less than 3 min and that ISPs are using 
this TTL manipulation, especially for mobile networks. 
The main contributions of this paper are the following:  
• We have identified a technique used by ISPs to get more information 
about the behaviour of their subscribers. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this was not documented previously in the literature. This 
technique is based in the manipulation of the TTL field in DNS re-
sponses and it compromises user privacy.  
• We have presented a methodology to enable subscribers to identify 
when their ISPs are manipulating the DNS responses in such a 
manner that they could obtain high resolution browsing information. 
The procedure uses only response times from DNS queries. 
• We have developed a public web tool which implements the afore-
mentioned methodology and we made the source code available. 
• We have carried out a measurement campaign to validate our pro-
posal and analysed the impact on privacy of Internet users in terms of 
the amount of information an ISP can collect by using the manipu-
lation of the TTL field in DNS responses. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes the manipulation of DNS responses to compromise user privacy. 
In Section 3, we explain the system that is used to collect DNS resolution 
times from end users. Then, in Section 4, we discuss the identification of 
DNS manipulation using DNS resolution times. In Section 5, we describe 
our online tool that enables Internet users to check if their DNS has been 
manipulated and, therefore, if their privacy has been compromised. In 
Section 6, we discuss results that were obtained using our online tool. In 
Section 7, we briefly describe related work. Finally, in Section 8, we 
present the conclusions of this study. 
2. Using DNS manipulation to compromise user privacy 
2.1. DNS caches 
When measuring the impact of changing the TTL of the DNS answers, 
several factors must be analysed. First, we must identify the types of DNS 
caches that store information about a domain when accessing an 
Internet service. An application will always try to retrieve the DNS in-
formation of a domain from a cache before making a DNS query to a 
server, as it is faster and requires fewer resources. Three types of DNS 
caches are commonly used by Internet applications: the browser or 
application cache, the operating system (OS) cache and the local DNS 
server cache (Fig. 1). These three caches store DNS information of do-
mains to reduce request/response times and to reduce the load at the 
authoritative DNS servers. 
As illustrated in Fig. 1, when a client application makes a DNS query 
for a new domain, the DNS information that is retrieved from the 
authoritative DNS server of the domain and served to the querying de-
vice by its local DNS server is stored in both the OS DNS cache of the 
device and the local DNS server that forwarded the answer. Both can 
store the information about the domain for the same amount of time, 
which is specified in the TTL field of the DNS answer, but this behaviour 
at the OS cache depends on the type of OS and the application. Once the 
answer has been cached by the OS, the client application can access the 
DNS information and also cache it for a duration that depends on the 
application that is being used. 
In the path between the authoritative DNS server and the local DNS 
server, there can be intermediate DNS servers. The cache of the local 
DNS server that forwards the DNS response stores the DNS information 
of the domain. The client application or host does not have any way to 
control the local DNS server cache; hence, this server can change the TTL 
of the DNS answers without the client’s consent. Any intermediate DNS 
server could change the TTL, but the effect would be the same for the 
Fig. 1. Agents that are involved in the task of answering a DNS query for a web 
browser in the client. 1 Available online at http://DNSPrivacyTester.tlm.unavarra.es. 
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end user. This local DNS server can store a DNS response for as long as 
the TTL indicates and modify this TTL in the responses that are delivered 
to the client host. The modified TTL is provided only to the client host; 
hence, subsequent requests from the client host can be resolved by the 
same local DNS server without increasing the load of the authoritative 
server of a domain. This cache plays an important role in our study since 
when we want to determine whether a local server is changing the TTL 
of a DNS answer, the DNS resolution times will depend on this cache. 
Fig. 2 illustrates a possible scenario: a device is accessing continu-
ously a specified Internet DNS domain with an authoritative TTL of 10 
min. By default, in a normal scenario (Fig. 2a), the device would make a 
DNS request every 10 min, thereby honouring the authoritative DNS 
TTL. The device would cache the DNS information for these 10 min. 
However, in the same scenario but with the local DNS server changing 
the DNS TTL to 1 min, the device would honour the modified DNS TTL 
and, hence, would make a DNS request each minute (Fig. 2b). In this 
case, the local DNS server would cache the domain for the authoritative 
TTL, thereby reducing the number of DNS requests to one each 10 min to 
the authoritative DNS server. With this DNS manipulation, the number 
of DNS requests that are submitted from the device and received by the 
local DNS server that is provided by the ISP would increase from 1 to 10 
requests each 10 min. 
The operating system caches in typical operating systems (for 
example, Windows and macOS) will respect the DNS TTL values that are 
specified by the local DNS server; hence, they do not affect the normal 
behaviour of the protocol when querying a domain name. In Linux 
distributions, there is no OS-level DNS caching unless extra services, 
such as NSCD or DNSmasq, are enabled. The name server caching 
daemon (NSCD) has a default cache time of 15 min and ignores any TTL 
values that are specified. The DNSmasq service uses the TTL value to 
determine the cache expiration time. In most cases, these services are 
not active in Linux by default; therefore, the DNS TTLs that are specified 
by a DNS server are not honoured. Then, the DNS cache that is imple-
mented at the user application determines the duration for which DNS 
records are stored. For browsers, this cache time is always fixed. 
For mobile devices, the behaviour differs. In Android systems, OS- 
level DNS caching is not conducted (as it uses a Linux kernel), and ap-
plications cache the DNS records by default. Applications in Android 
typically cache the DNS records by honouring the authoritative TTL 
values (in contrast to applications in Linux), and if the TTL value is lower 
than 60 s, the application cache stores the DNS records for a minimum of 
60 s. In iOS systems, there is no OS DNS cache or browser DNS cache; 
hence, these systems completely rely on the DNS servers and their 
caches. 
For desktop devices (Windows, macOS, and Linux), the client’s 
application DNS cache typically alters the normal behaviour of the DNS, 
and the duration for which it stores the DNS responses depends of the 
client application that is being used. We will consider web browsers as 
the main examples of client applications. 
Table 1 presents the periods of time for which several of the most 
popular browsers (Statcounter, 2020) enforce cache DNS records by 
default, which depend on the operating system that is being used. Most 
of these browsers cache results for 60 s or more, and this time is fixed 
independently of the TTL in the DNS response. This table was con-
structed by analysing the DNS traffic of devices when various browsers 
Fig. 2. DNS queries that are performed a) in a normal scenario with an authoritative TTL of 10 min and b) in a scenario with DNS manipulation, in which the TTL is 
changed to 1 min at the local DNS server. 
Table 1 
Most popular browsers’ DNS cache times.  
Operating 
system 







Opera 63.0.3368.84 60 
Mozilla Firefox 68.0.1 60 
Microsoft IE 11.799.17134.0 1800 
Microsoft Edge 44.18362 1800 
macOS 10.14.6 Chrome 76.0.3809.100 60 
Mozilla Firefox 68.0.1 60 
Safari 12.1.2 0 
Android 
9.0 
Google Chrome 76.0.3809.132 original TTL,  
with a minimum of 60 
Firefox 68.0.1 original TTL,  
with a minimum of 60 
Samsung Internet 9.4 original TTL,  
with a minimum of 60 
iOS 12.4 Chrome 76.0.3809.100 0 
Mozilla Firefox 68.0.1 0 
Mobile Safari 12.1.2 0 
Linux Ubuntu 
18.04 
Chromium 76.0.3809.100 60 
Firefox 68.0.1 60  
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were being used, and it is consistent with the data that were gathered in 
a previous study (Klein and Pinkas, 2019). To obtain these results, we 
configured a device with each of the operating systems and with each of 
the web browsers to use a local DNS server that was under our control 
using the DNS server software named Bind. In the configuration of Bind, 
we specified that it was a forwarding DNS server and that the TTL for 
every domain would be set to 0 in the DNS response that was sent to the 
clients. Then, we queried a specified web address each second for a 
whole day for each combination of operating system and web browser, 
and we checked how many queries were resolved by the browser’s cache 
before querying the authoritative DNS server. 
The use of a DNS cache at the application level (browser) has been 
reported several times (Cohen and Kaplan, 2001), and there is an 
ongoing debate regarding whether it is useful or not. The behaviour we 
observed during our research is that when the browser or other client 
application accesses a resource on the Internet, it conducts a query 
regarding the domain. Then, the information from the response is 
cached in the operating system cache, and the browser accesses it and 
stores this information for a minimal period of time, regardless of the 
TTL value that is specified in the DNS response. When the information 
that is stored in the browser cache expires, it accesses the operating 
system cache again until the DNS information that is stored in the 
operating system’s cache expires. 
This client application cache limits the effect of reducing the TTL 
value of the DNS responses because even though the ISP DNS servers can 
reduce it to as low as 0 s (to disable the DNS cache), the responses are 
cached in the client application cache for a minimum time regardless of 
the TTL. Therefore, new DNS requests will be conducted only when the 
browser’s cache expires (in most cases, every minute, as specified in 
Table 1), thereby limiting the effectiveness of this technique. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the sources of DNS information regarding a domain 
that an application may query to access an Internet service. Of the three 
caches it can access, the only cache that can have a fixed TTL value 
should be the browser’s cache. Both the OS cache and the local DNS 
server cache should expire according to the TTL value that is specified by 
the authoritative server in the DNS response. The minimum time that a 
DNS response will be cached by a browser that made a DNS query will be 
determined by the browser’s DNS cache. 
2.2. Changing of the DNS TTL against the user’s privacy 
The information that an ISP can extract by analysing the DNS traffic 
is independent of the encryption that other protocols such as TLS or 
HTTPS provide at the application layer. The information that is provided 
by DNS queries is easy to analyse and does not require complex algo-
rithms to be processed, as the domain name that is visited by the user is 
specified in the DNS request packets that are sent to the local DNS 
servers. The ISP typically provides this local DNS server to its sub-
scribers, and the DNS logs can be collected and analysed easily. This 
information can be used to construct a user’s Internet browsing profile, 
which can be used for lucrative purposes or even sold to third parties. 
It is not technically possible to prevent ISPs from extracting data 
about their clients through the DNS, except by changing the local DNS 
server that is in use (e.g., to the Google public DNS or the Cloudflare 
public DNS). Nonetheless, the DNS resolver that is selected for resolving 
the queries could still collect information about their clients. However, 
changing the TTL value of the DNS responses and, therefore, altering the 
normal behaviour of the Internet is an active method for information 
collection that is conducted without the user’s awareness. When using a 
technique of this type, the privacy of Internet users is compromised, and 
their data are exposed. 
The simplicity and low cost of reducing the TTL value of DNS re-
sponses to obtain better information about the users of a network render 
this technique suitable for other environments, such as those with open 
Wi-Fi networks. These networks include locations such as malls, parks or 
other public places in which the technique, when applied, leaves the 
user’s privacy exposed and enables DNS server administrators to collect 
information about any person that connects to the network. The 
collected information can depend on the location of the client; therefore, 
it can be used to provide more personal and targeted services to the 
client, such as showing ads or promoting services with special conditions 
that are selected according to the websites that the client has browsed. 
The DNS TTL modification can be conducted by using transparent 
DNS proxies even if we do not control the local DNS server (Vavrusa and 
Grant, 2018; Kührer et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2018). These proxies are 
being used by several ISPs to intercept all the user’s DNS lookup requests 
and to transparently proxy and cache the results. This forces the users to 
use the transparent DNS proxy, even if they have changed their DNS 
settings to use an ‘open’ DNS server or any other local DNS server. 
Hence, changing the DNS settings at the client side is not a solution for 
preventing ISPs from collecting information by reducing the TTL of the 
DNS answers. 
As has been discussed previously, several strategies have been 
developed for gathering information about the user through the DNS 
(García-Dorado et al., 2018; Kim and Zhang, 2015; Chitpranee and 
Fukuda, 2013). These strategies obtain the chain of the main websites 
that have been visited by the user while ignoring the domains that host 
secondary content, such as ads, images, and social network widgets. 
They use the DNS requests that have been conducted over time to 
identify the browsing chain. Not all web requests generate DNS requests 
due to the use of the caches; hence, estimations are conducted by 
considering TTL of each requested domain. In addition, modern 
browsers use prefetch and preload techniques (Monrose and Krishnan, 
2010), which generate ghost requests and their corresponding DNS re-
quests, thereby complicating the identification. These strategies focus 
mostly on extracting information regarding the number of times a user 
visits a domain that can be clearly differentiated when accessed (because 
a new DNS request is generated each time). The same inference with 
popular domains is highly difficult because a DNS request can be con-
ducted via the secondary content of another website (for example, a 
Google maps widget on a commercial web site). The accuracy of these 
systems can be improved significantly if the DNS TTL can be selected. 
For example, if all domains would have the same TTL, websites that have 
been visited the same number of times would generate the same number 
of DNS requests. The state-of-the-art identification strategies would be 
able to collect information about the number of times a user visits both 
popular domains and less popular domains, and all the websites would 
make DNS queries for their root domain records more frequently. This 
would enable a simpler identification system that would count a visit 
whenever it would receive a DNS query for the root domain of a 
webpage. 
2.3. Most common TTLs in DNS domains 
To analyse the possible impact of reducing the TTL value of DNS 
responses, we examined the TTL values of the most popular Internet 
websites. Fig. 3 displays the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 
the TTL values for the 10,000 most popular websites on the Internet 
according to the Alexa Top 1 million sites on the Internet ranking from 
September 2019 (Alexa, 2020). We collected these data by directly 
querying the authoritative name servers of each domain. Approximately 
75% of these domains have a TTL that exceeds 300 s. For these domains, 
one DNS request each 5 min would be intercepted by the ISP without 
TTL modification. Almost 90% of the domains have TTLs that exceed 60 
s; hence, the technique of reducing the TTL of DNS answers is useful 
even in the presence of the application cache (typically 60 s). 
Fig. 4 presents the CDF of TTL values of Internet domains that 
represent 44.26% of the Internet’s web traffic, according to the Sim-
ilarWeb top-50 websites in the Internet ranking (SimilarWeb, 2020). 
This graph has been constructed by identifying the authoritative TTL 
values of these 50 domains, multiplying each of these values by the 
percentage of web traffic they cursed and dividing the result by the total 
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amount of traffic they all shared. Table 2 presents the twenty most 
representative domains by traffic from the SimilarWeb classification and 
their TTLs from September 2019. 
According to Fig. 4 and Table 2, approximately 90% of the domains 
with more traffic have TTL values of 300 s or longer. Therefore, reducing 
the TTL values of the DNS responses that contain the DNS records of 
these domains can increase by 5 times the number of DNS requests. This 
increase can provide 5 times more information about a user’s navigation 
profile, and it can increase the accuracy of the systems that are used to 
analyse user traffic. 
A previous study of a dataset of DNS queries that were made by 85 
clients (Callahan et al., 2013) yielded similar results: more than 70% of 
the dataset’s Internet traffic was conducted by connections to domains 
with TTL values that exceeded 100 s. The diversity of the TTL values 
among the domains in the Internet reduce the ISPs’ performance in 
characterizing their clients’ traffic. Therefore, having a unique, low TTL 
value that is for all the domains that their servers resolve is enormously 
helpful for characterising their clients’ traffic. 
2.4. Performance problems that are due to TTL reduction 
The reduction of DNS TTL results in related performance problems in 
the client side: increases in the amount of DNS traffic and in the delay in 
client applications. This is because DNS requests/responses are small 
packets and they are sent by or to a local DNS server over a relatively 
short distance; hence, the RTT is typically on the order of milliseconds. 
However, these problems are not significant. 
In the server side, the performance problems will be related to the 
increase in the number of received DNS requests. These requests can be 
more bursty due to DNS request synchronization. If the TTL is reduced 
by a factor of 10, the number of DNS requests and, therefore, the load in 
the local DNS server are increased by a factor of 10. Typically, local DNS 
servers attend to relatively few clients; hence, this scalability is possible. 
If this increase would affect to root DNS servers or authoritative DNS 
servers, the scalability problems would be more severe, but this does not 
occur because the TTL modification is conducted at the local DNS server 
or in an intermediate DNS transparent proxy. Those use cache systems, 
and they respond to the increasing rate of DNS requests while not 
affecting root DNS servers or authoritative DNS servers. 
For a bursty load, in a scenario with a TTL modification to 10 s for all 
domains, DNS cached domains would expire at the same moment for 
almost all domains, thereby requiring the local DNS server to attend to 
many queries in a short period of time and, thus, to require more re-
sources than usual to perform its tasks. As most ISPs have no interest in 
increasing the loads at local DNS servers, they typically change the TTL 
of the DNS responses at an intermediate local DNS server (a local DNS 
server or a transparent DNS proxy) so that the ISP can scale more easily 
the intermediate server. 
This technique also prevents a domain owner from detecting the use 
of this technique, as it cannot determine whether a local DNS server is 
changing the TTL of the DNS answers it serves. This renders our study 
more difficult as we can only demonstrate that there are ISPs that are 
reducing the TTL of the DNS answers by collecting data from the client 
side. Low TTL values for a domain were already being used by domain 
owners to facilitate domain migrations, as the DNS records would expire 
faster and, therefore, the user would obtain the new mapping from the 
FQDN to the new IP address faster. The use of this technique could 
explain some cases in which the TTL values of domains are sporadically 
lower. In contrast, in the case of DNS manipulation, we observed that 
TTL changes occurred in some ISPs for all DNS responses indiscrimin-
ately and over time. 
2.5. Threat model 
To analyse threats in a typical residential access provided by an ISP, 
we employ a widely used systematic approach to threat modeling, called 
STRIDE (acronym for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information 
disclosure, Denial of service and Elevation of privilege) which was 
created by Loren Kohnfelder and Praerit Garg (Kohnfelder and Garg, 
1999; Hernan et al., 2006). 
It is assumed that the ISP is not trying to impersonate/spoof the user, 
tamper user service data, infiltrate in user systems or disrupt the service 
in any way that would make the user just use another ISP. The ISP is in a 
perfect man-in-the-middle position and could use this advantage to 
Fig. 3. CDF of the TTLs of DNS answers that were generated by querying the 
authoritative DNS servers of the 10,000 most popular websites on the Internet 
according to the Alexa ranking. 
Fig. 4. CDF of the TTLs of the top-50 domains, which represent 44.26% of 
Internet traffic, in terms of traffic contribution, according to the Sim-
ilarWeb ranking. 
Table 2 
Traffic shares and TTL values of the 20 most visited domains of the Internet 
according to SimilarWeb.  
Domain ranking position by traffic Domain Traffic share TTL (s) 
1 google.com 18.18% 300 
2 youtube.com 7.06% 300 
3 facebook.com 5.80% 300 
4 baidu.com 1.46% 600 
5 wikipedia.org 1.19% 600 
6 yahoo.com 0.96% 1800 
7 twitter.com 0.92% 1800 
8 pornhub.com 0.79% 3600 
9 instagram.com 0.73% 60 
10 yandex.ru 0.72% 300 
11 xvideos.com 0.69% 300 
12 xnxx.com 0.59% 300 
13 ampproject.org 0.58% 300 
14 amazon.com 0.57% 60 
15 live.com 0.57% 3600 
16 vk.com 0.51% 900 
17 netflix.com 0.47% 60 
18 qq.com 0.40% 600 
19 mail.ru 0.40% 60 
20 whatsapp.com 0.39% 300  
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attack the users but these attacks are out of the scope of this work. 
The DNS model usually puts the ISP as a proxy for external DNS 
servers, as shown in Fig. 5. The single head arrows describe the 
behaviour that the DNS service is meant to follow, a request is sent by 
the client, if needed the ISP’s DNS server queries the Global DNS service 
for the DNS answer, and then the DNS server sends the response to the 
client. As DNS information stays rather stable, this interaction is 
refreshed regularly, governed by the expiration of timers whose values 
are decided by global DNS servers. 
In this scenario, the relay of DNS queries poses a threat of user in-
formation disclosure as it provides the ISP with the domain names the 
client is requesting to be resolved. This may be used to perform client 
profiling for commercial purposes. 
Moreover the ISP can tamper with DNS data coming from global 
servers before relaying it to the users. This may be stopped by the users 
by configuring strong authentication from global DNS servers (DNSSEC) 
or by using cyphered communication to its own trusted DNS servers (for 
example using DoH) instead of using the ISP provided DNS servers. 
However most residential users don’t worry enough about privacy or 
lack technical expertise to know the threat and to carry out any of these 
remedies. 
By tampering DNS data, the ISP can achieve denial of service to 
clients by providing wrong responses to some queries. This would cause 
service disruption to the users, which is not in the interest of the ISP, 
whose payed job is precisely providing correct network connectivity. 
Thus, it is used only in extreme cases like when asking for recognised 
malware sites or for accomplishing legally-requested mandatory block-
ing of piracy sites. 
A more useful tampering for ISPs would be to interact with DNS 
expiration dates. It is well known that the DNS service is being used by 
ISPs to profile their users (Yan and Lee, 2020). Reducing the TTL value 
of DNS records in the responses results in more frequent requests from 
the users and therefore more information that could be used to improve 
a profile about clients, increasing the already existing threat for infor-
mation disclosure. It is not a new type of information that is gained but 
the frequency of this information that is increased. Gathering more 
frequent information allows a better profiling, more invasive of user 
privacy. In a non-compromised scenario, maybe the only information 
that the ISP can obtain is that the user accessed a web site at least once in 
a day; however, decreasing the DNS TTL to 5 min it could know how 
many times he visited this web site and when in the day it did so, with 5 
min resolution. 
DNS response modifications could be observed by the client using 
access link monitoring. However, it does not affect general perceived 
performance, thus a typical residential internet user with no technical 
background is unlikely to notice it. 
3. Online tool for obtaining DNS resolution times 
We are interested in detecting when the privacy of an end user has 
been compromised via modification of the TTL in DNS responses. The 
easiest way for a user to check for DNS-TTL manipulation would be to 
use the typical utilities for DNS resolution in the command line interface 
(such as the dig/nslookup command tools) to request a specified domain 
from the client side and to examine the TTL value of the DNS answer that 
is delivered by the local DNS server. This value can be compared with 
the authoritative TTL (which is obtained without using DNS requests 
that could be also modified). If they do not match (considering the 
remaining time in the cache), it is assumed that a local DNS server is 
altering the DNS service. An executable or mobile app could be devel-
oped for collecting this information, but this is not practical as most 
people are reluctant to download a tool with a single function that is 
executed in a short period of time. We require a tool for collecting the 
DNS resolution times of end-users across the Internet as easily as 
possible. 
A more convenient strategy for collecting massive DNS resolution 
times from end-users was to develop a web service that would not 
require to the user to download files and that could be used from any 
device. This web service is extended in next sections to detect whether 
the privacy of a user is being compromised, and it can report the results 
in a short period of time. 
The first problem we faced in developing this tool was that is not 
possible to conduct DNS queries from a web page or to access the TTL 
information of DNS responses from a web browser. Commercial web 
tools are available that request resources for which records are allocated 
to a DNS server that they control and retrieve for users the information 
that was collected by their DNS servers. However, our objective was to 
prove that Internet users’ privacy was being compromised by DNS 
servers that ISPs control. Most local DNS servers that are controlled by 
ISPs are private; hence, directly querying them was not a viable strategy 
for determining whether they were altering the DNS service. ISP sub-
scribers are the only entities that can provide data on whether the ISPs 
are altering the DNS service or not. Therefore, a system that collects data 
from the subscribers had to be developed. 
The end-user (ISP subscriber) will access a webpage with his web 
browser. Then, the web browser of the end-user must request additional 
web resources periodically over a period of time and capture the DNS 
resolution times that they required for loading. To realize this, we 
created a JavaScript code that was embedded in the webpage that re-
quests through AJAX a URL (uniform resource locator, which charac-
terizes a full webpage path) with a polling interval (typically 10 s). To 
bypass the browser’s cache we used different URLs in every request. Via 
this approach, for each request, a different TCP connection to the server 
will be used (with no persistent connections), along with a new DNS 
query, if necessary. 
The DNS resolution times of the requested resources are displayed in 
the developer tools network menu that most browsers feature; however, 
we must automate the recollection of these data. Through a JavaScript 
API, namely, PerformanceResourceTiming (Grigorik, 2020), we can 
access these resolution times using the values of the domainLookupStart 
and domainLookupEnd fields that are returned by the API. This API is still 
in a development phase and behaves differently among browsers. In 
some browsers, such as Mozilla Firefox, the DNS resolution times that 
are specified by the API are not exactly the same as those that are shown 
in the developer tools network tab. Other browsers, such as Safari, do 
not fully support the API, and others have such high DNS caching times 
(e.g., Internet Explorer or Edge) that if we want the service to deliver the 
result of the test quickly, their use is not a viable option. The browser 
that procured the best results was Google Chrome. Its caching time is 
low (only 1 min), it is available for all OSs and platforms, and the res-
olution times that are specified by the API are more accurate than those 
that are specified by other browsers (instead of delivering the DNS 
resolution times in milliseconds, it delivers them in microseconds). This 
provides us with more reliable information about the DNS resolution 
times and, therefore, about which cache source is queried to obtain the 
DNS record of a domain at each moment. 
The web service was spread among Internet users, mainly in Spain. 
More than ten thousand tests were conducted by more than one thou-
sand users during August and September of 2019. The tool requests a Fig. 5. Components of the system being analysed for the threat model.  
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random URL within the test domain every 10 s for up to several hours, 
depending on the time for which the user keeps the webpage open. The 
test domain has an authoritative TTL of 180 s. Table 3 presents the total 
number of Internet users that used our tool and the number of samples 
that were collected from them. A sample consists of each DNS resolution 
time that was observed while a user was conducting the test. As we 
allowed the users conduct the test an unlimited number of times, many 
users conducted it for several minutes; hence, the number of provided 
samples differed among users in the research. Desktop users conducted 
longer tests than mobile users, and for example the number of samples 
from macOS is larger than that from Android, although the number of 
users of the former is smaller. 
4. Identification of DNS TTL manipulation 
4.1. DNS behaviours per operating system 
Let’s consider a scenario in which the domain that is being used 
while gathering data has an authoritative TTL of 180 s. Suppose the 
client is using a desktop application (for example, a browser) that has an 
application cache timeout of 60 s (e.g., the Google Chrome browser, as 
shown in Table 1). The application requests the resolution of the domain 
every 10 s, and it continues to send the requests for 180 s (the author-
itative TTL). We will analyse a normal scenario (without TTL modifi-
cation) and a privacy-compromised scenario (with TTL modification), 
along with their variants, according to the peculiarities of each OS. 
In a normal scenario and an OS DNS cache (Windows or macOS), we 
should obtain:  
● 15 queries to the DNS browser cache: using a 60-s browser cache, 5 
out of 6 requests are resolved by this cache.  
● 2 queries to the OS DNS cache: with a cache timer value at this level 
equivalent to the authoritative TTL, from the 3 requests that are not 
resolved in the browser cache (one every 60 s), 2 are resolved by the 
OS DNS cache.  
● 1 query to the authoritative DNS server through the local DNS server: 
only 1 request every 180 s is not solved by previous caches. 
This behaviour is represented in Fig. 6. In total, approximately 
83.33% of the DNS resolution times should correspond to the browser’s 
DNS cache, 11.1% of the resolution times should correspond to the OS 
DNS cache and 5.56% of the resolution times should correspond to DNS 
queries that were made to the domain authoritative servers. 
In a normal scenario but without an OS DNS cache and with an 
application DNS cache that is equivalent to the original TTL (Android 
devices), we should obtain:  
● 17 queries to the DNS browser cache: as Android application DNS 
caches honour the TTL of DNS answers, in a 180-s interval, this cache 
is accessed for 170 s.  
● 1 query to the authoritative DNS server through the local DNS server: 
only 1 request every 180 s is not responded to by the application’s 
cache. 
Those queries are represented in Fig. 7. In total, approximately 
94.44% of the DNS resolution times should correspond to the browser’s 
DNS cache, and 5.56% of the resolution times should correspond to DNS 
queries that were made to the authoritative servers of the domain. 
In a normal scenario without an OS DNS cache and with a browser 
DNS cache of 1 min (the Linux case), we should obtain:  
● 15 queries to the DNS browser cache: with a 60-s browser cache, 5 of 
each 6 requests are resolved in this cache.  
● 2 queries to the local DNS server cache: with a cache timer value at 
this level equivalent to the authoritative TTL, from the 3 requests 
that are not resolved in the browser cache (one every 60 s), 2 are 
resolved by the local DNS cache.  
● 1 query to the authoritative DNS server through the local DNS server: 
only 1 request every 180 s is not solved by previous caches. 
Those queries are represented in Fig. 8. In total, approximately 
83.33% of the DNS resolution times should correspond to the browser’s 
DNS cache and 11.1% to the local DNS server cache, and 5.56% of the 
resolution times should correspond to DNS queries that are made to the 
authoritative servers of the domain. 
In a normal scenario without an OS DNS cache or a browser DNS 
cache (the iOS case), none of the DNS queries are solved by the device, 
and we should obtain: 
Table 3 
Numbers of users and collected samples per operating system.  
Operating system Number of users Number of collected samples 
Windows 1131 206,495 
macOS 215 61,589 
Android 960 24,023 
Linux 266 60,817 
iOS 77 1104  
Fig. 6. DNS sources that are queried by Windows and macOS devices in a 
normal scenario. 
Fig. 7. DNS sources that are queried by Android devices in a normal scenario.  
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● 17 queries to the local DNS server cache: the queries that are made 
every 10 s would only be solved by this DNS record source.  
● 1 query to the authoritative DNS server through the local DNS server: 
only 1 request every 180 s is not solved by previous caches. 
In this scenario, which is illustrated in Fig. 9, 94.44% of the DNS 
resolution times should correspond to the local DNS server cache, and 
5.56% of the resolution times should correspond to DNS queries that are 
made to the authoritative servers of the domain. 
We can generalize to any authoritative TTL (TTLauth), any polling 
interval (tpoll), any browser cache time (tbrowser) and the use of an OS DNS 
cache (OS = 1 if used and OS = 0 otherwise). For iOS, the lack of a 
browser cache is represented by tbrowser = 0. 
We define tlocal as the maximum value between the browser cache 
time and the polling interval, that will represent the time interval be-
tween DNS requests from the client to the local DNS server. We define A’ 
as the maximum time during which there will be no requests to the local 
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A normal scenario will be characterized by the number of occur-
rences of each type of request as described in equations (3)–(6). 
In a privacy-compromised scenario (in which the ISP changes the 
TTL), the sources of DNS responses change according to the modified 
TTL. For a TTL that has been changed to less than the default browser 
cache time (1 min typically), the OS cache is not used as a DNS infor-
mation source as it always expires before it receives a new request. For 
example, if the modified TTL is 10 s, we should obtain:  
● 15 queries to the DNS browser cache: with a 60-s browser cache, 5 of 
each 6 requests are resolved in this cache.  
● 2 queries to the local DNS server cache: since the modified TTL is too 
low, the OS DNS cache expires before a new request is received from 
the browser, and the device queries the local DNS server again.  
● 1 query to the authoritative DNS server through the local DNS server: 
only 1 request every 180 s is not solved by previous caches. 
Hence, approximately 83.33% of the DNS resolution times should 
correspond to the browser DNS cache, 11.1% of the resolution times 
should correspond to queries that are resolved by the local DNS server 
cache, and 5.56% of the resolution times should correspond to DNS 
queries that are made to the authoritative servers for the domain in-
formation. Fig. 10 illustrates the sources that a device would query in the 
Fig. 8. DNS sources that are queried by Linux devices in a normal scenario.  
Fig. 9. DNS sources that are queried by iOS devices in a normal scenario.  
Fig. 10. DNS sources that are queried by a device in a privacy- 
compromised scenario. 
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privacy-compromised scenario. Comparing Figs. 6–9 and Fig. 10, we can 
identify the differences between the scenarios. For a privacy- 
compromised scenario with a modified TTL that exceeds the default 
browser cache, for example, 80 s, intermediate values that are between 
those of the previous scenarios are obtained. 
Let’s denote the modified TTL as (TTLmauth). We define TTLmauth′ as 
the maximum value between the modified TTL and the polling interval 
that will represent the time interval between DNS requests to the 






We can generalize to any modified authoritative TTL (TTLmauth), any 
polling interval (tpoll), any browser cache time (tbrowser) and the use of an 
OS DNS cache (OS = 1 if used and OS = 0 otherwise). For iOS, the 
absence of a browser cache is again represented by tbrowser = 0. A 
compromised scenario will be characterized by the number of occur-
rences of each type of request computed by equations (8)–(11). 
This characterization will be used to identify when a user is in a 
normal or a privacy-compromised scenario. For operating systems with 
an OS DNS cache, DNS requests to the local DNS server (Fig. 10) will be 
essential for identifying a privacy-compromised scenario. 
Using these formulas, we extracted the percentages of queries to each 
DNS resolution source for TTLs of 180, 300 and 3600 s. For simplicity, 
we established a polling interval of 10 s for all cases, and we set the value 
of the modified TTL to 10 s. The obtained results for the normal and 
privacy-compromised scenarios are presented in Table 4. 
We collected data from over a thousand users who used our privacy 
tester tool (Section 3), some of whose DNS responses were being 
manipulated and others whose privacy was not being compromised. The 
tool probes every 10 s during an interval of up to several hours, which 
depends on the user. The test domain had an authoritative TTL of 180 s. 
Fig. 11 presents the complementary cumulative distribution functions 
(CCDFs) of the DNS resolution times of five random users whose privacy 
is not being compromised (because they follow patterns such as that in 
Figs. 6–9), each of whom is using a different operating system (with or 
without an OS DNS cache). The distributions show drops down in 
various time instants for each user that are related to the 4 DNS times 
that we discussed previously (browser, OS, local DNS and authoritative 
DNS). 
In Fig. 11 a, for Windows, 3 drops down are observed, which 
correspond to 3 sources of DNS resolution: (from left to right) the 
browser DNS cache (at 20us), the OS DNS cache (at 0.8 ms) and the 
authoritative DNS server through the local DNS server (at 70 ms). The 
percentage of DNS queries that are resolved by the sources of DNS in-
formation for all samples that were collected by our online tool are 
presented in Table 5. This table compares the experimental results with 
the theoretical results that are obtained by applying expressions (1–11). 
The percentage of samples for each source matches the theoretical value 
that was calculated previously, thereby supporting our hypothesis. 
The largest difference between the theoretical and experimental re-
sults is observed for macOS. This is attributed to the macOS DNS cache 
being so efficient that the difference between the DNS resolution times 
when accessing it versus the browser’s DNS cache is small; hence, we 
might have counted some of the resolutions that corresponded to the 
browser’s cache as OS resolutions. However, the sum of the two corre-
sponds to 94.35% of the resolutions, which is very close to the corre-
sponding theoretical result, namely, 94.45%. 
The first two drops down in the CCDF are not exactly at the same 
timestamps for the users because their computers differ in terms of CPU 
power, operating system and browser. However, the time scales are 
highly similar: the browser DNS cache is on the order of tens of micro-
seconds and the OS DNS cache is on the order of milliseconds. The 
resolution times for the authoritative DNS server are similar for the 
users, and the values are on the order of tens of milliseconds. 
For Android and macOS users, only two drops down can be observed. 
In Android, the browsers rely completely on their own DNS cache. In 
macOS, the DNS resolution times when accessing the operating system 
cache are so low that they cannot be distinguished from accesses to the 
browser cache. According to Fig. 11, neither iOS nor Linux systems have 
by default an OS DNS cache that honours a domain TTL value, as we 
demonstrated previously. As both systems will query local DNS servers 
whenever the browser DNS cache expires, we cannot determine whether 
a client’s ISP is modifying the TTL of DNS answers when using one of 
these operating systems. 
Fig. 12 presents the CCDF of the DNS resolution times of an example 
user whose privacy is being compromised (the ISP is changing the TTL to 
10 s). For Windows and macOS users, the privacy-compromised profiles 
are almost equal because there is no OS DNS cache affecting Windows, 
according to Table 4. The “desktop user” curve of Fig. 12 can be applied 
to both. In this case, there are also 3 drops down that correspond to 3 
sources of DNS resolution: (from left to right) the browser DNS cache, 
the local DNS cache and the authoritative DNS server. The percentage of 
samples for each source matches the theoretical values that were 
calculated previously. For the mobile user of Fig. 12, there are 3 drops 
down that correspond to the same sources of DNS records as in Fig. 11, 
whereas in a normal scenario, there should only be 2. Fig. 12 also shows 
Ratio of queries to the DNS browser cache  Rmbrowser =Rbrowser (8)       
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the theoretical curves that were obtained via expressions (1–11) for each 
case. The theoretical curves were obtained by creating as many cache 
accesses (browser cache, local DNS server cache and authoritative DNS 
server) as there should be in a period, according to Table 4. The values of 
the resolution times of each type of source are determined by the 
probability of obtaining a time value for each source cache. 
The profiles in Figs. 11 and 12 show that it is possible to distinguish 
between normal and privacy-compromised scenarios. In a privacy- 
compromised scenario, the presence of high intermediate resolution 
times that are close to the authoritative resolution times that correspond 
to local DNS server resolutions will indicate that the TTL field is being 
modified. This characteristic will be used by our tool to offer an auto-
mated system for the identification of privacy-compromised scenarios. 
4.2. DNS resolution times by cache type 
Four types of sources are used by a browser (or any other client 
application) when it wants to resolve a domain: the browser cache, the 
OS DNS cache, the local DNS server cache and the authoritative DNS 
server through the local DNS server. These requests/responses will differ 
in terms of resolution time. If we identify which source is answering our 
Table 4 
Ratios of queries to each DNS information source according to the values of the domain TTL, the browser cache and the presence of an OS DNS cache.     
Browser OS Local Authoritative 
TTLauth  tbrowser  OS Normal &  
Compromised 
Normal Compromised Normal Compromised Normal &  
Compromised 
180 60 1 83.33% 11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 5.56% 
60 0 83.33% 0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 11.11% 5.56% 
0 1 0.00% 94.44% 0.00% 0.00% 94.44% 5.56% 
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 94.44% 94.44% 5.56% 
300 60 1 83.33% 13.33% 0.00% 0.00% 13.33% 3.33% 
60 0 83.33% 0.00% 0.00% 13.33% 13.33% 3.33% 
0 1 0.00% 96.67% 0.00% 0.00% 96.67% 3.33% 
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 96.67% 96.67% 3.33% 
3600 60 1 83.33% 16.39% 0.00% 0.00% 16.39% 0.28% 
60 0 83.33% 0.00% 0.00% 16.39% 16.39% 0.28% 
0 1 0.00% 99.72% 0.00% 0.00% 99.72% 0.28% 
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 99.72% 99.72% 0.28%  
Fig. 11. CCDFs of the DNS resolution times for five example users in the 
normal scenario (no TTL modification), which are differentiated by operating 
system and environment: a) desktop environments and b) mobile environments. 
Table 5 
Ratios of the DNS queries that were resolved by each DNS information source according to the experimental and theoretical results.   
Browser cache Operating system cache Local server cache Authoritative server cache 
Theoretical Experimental Theoretical Experimental Theoretical Experimental Theoretical Experimental 
Windows 83.33% 83.36% 11.11% 11.10% 0.00% 0.00% 5.56% 5.55% 
macOS 83.33% 80.43% 11.11% 13.93% 0.00% 0.00% 5.56% 5.65% 
Linux 83.33% 83.87% 0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 10.48% 5.56% 5.65% 
Android 94.44% 94.17% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.56% 5.83% 
iOS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 94.44% 94.74% 5.56% 5.26%  
Fig. 12. CCDFs of the DNS resolution times for two example users in the 
privacy-compromised scenario (ISP changes TTL), which are differentiated by 
platform: desktop (Windows/macOS) and mobile (Android). 
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request, we will be able to determine if an ISP is manipulating the TTL 
field of the DNS responses. 
To characterize these resolution times, we have used the collected 
information from our online tool (Section 3). We divided the DNS res-
olution times into 4 groups according to the source of the response: the 
browser cache, the OS cache, the local DNS server cache and the 
authoritative DNS server (through the local DNS server). The times are 
associated with the caches according to the sequence in which they 
appear in successive responses, as expressed in expressions (1–11). The 
DNS resolution time for each source will vary according to the device 
(operating system) that is being used. We distinguish among the main 
operating systems in desktop environments (Windows, Linux, and 
macOS) and mobile environments (Android, iOS). Fig. 13 presents the 
CDFs of the DNS resolution times that are observed for each of the DNS 
information sources that the operating systems may access for resolving 
DNS queries. 
In the figure, the timings of the browser and OS caches can differ 
among the operating systems. Linux and Android systems do not have an 
operating system cache by default; hence, their browsers rely completely 
on their own application cache. For the iOS platform (Apple iPhone and 
iPad devices), no figure is provided because they do not have a browser 
cache or an OS cache. For each platform, the differences in the distri-
butions of the DNS resolution times among the 4 caches are used to 
determine whether a DNS request has been answered by each cache by 
focusing on the DNS resolution time. These differences are reported in 
Table 6. Clients using the online tool had heterogeneous OS versions. 
Windows users varied from Windows 7 to Windows 10. Android users 
were in a broad range from Android 4.4.2 (KitKat) to Android 10 
(Android Q). macOS versions were as old as OS X Lion (10.7.1) or as 
recent as macOS Catalina (10.15.1). Finally, Linux users reported Ker-
nels version 3 and version 4. 
According to Fig. 13 and Table 6, the range of DNS response times 
from different sources sometimes overlap. For example, a resolution 
time of 0.25 ms can correspond to an access to either the OS cache or the 
browser cache in Windows OS. However, the sequence of expected re-
sponses from expressions (1–11) can facilitate the identification of the 
cache source. The local DNS server response times always exceed the OS 
cache response times and are always lower than the times when 
querying an authoritative DNS. These DNS response times can be 
characterized to determine which DNS source the client application is 
using and to deduce the occurrence of DNS TTL manipulation. In plat-
forms such as Android or Linux, there is no OS DNS cache. In Android, 
the DNS response times that correspond to accesses to the browser DNS 
cache can be much longer and can exceed 1 ms in some cases. In the case 
of macOS, the time that is needed to resolve DNS queries by accessing 
the operating system cache is so short that it is not possible to differ-
entiate when the browser is accessing its own DNS cache or the oper-
ating system DNS cache; hence, it is the most reliable operating system 
for determining whether an ISP is manipulating the DNS service. 
Fig. 13. CDF of the DNS resolution times of each DNS source that an operating 
system can access. a) Windows, b) Android, c) macOS, and d) Linux. 
Table 6 
DNS resolution times (in milliseconds) of the DNS sources for various platforms.   
Windows Android macOS iOS Linux 
Browser DNS cache 0.01–0.3 0.1–2 0.01–0.1 – 0.001–0.25 
Operating system DNS 
cache 
0.2–6 – 0.01–0.1 – – 
Local DNS server 
cache 
>0.4 >0.4 >0.4 >0.4 >0.4 
Authoritative DNS 
server query 
>1 >1 >1 >1 >1  
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5. DNSPrivacyTester tool for identifying TTL-DNS manipulation 
5.1. Selection of operational parameters 
The online tool that is described in Section 3 for obtaining DNS 
resolution times has been extended to identify the source cache of each 
DNS resolution for the identification of a privacy-compromised scenario. 
As explained previously, our service determines whether an Internet 
user’s privacy is being compromised by requesting periodically a URL 
resource. To ensure that the DNS records of this resource have not been 
previously requested by another client of the same local DNS server, we 
assign each client a random subdomain that is composed of 21 random 
characters. To do this, we configured our domain as a Wildcard DNS 
record (Lewis, 2006), which allows clients to access the resources of the 
server using various subdomains of the main domain that is assigned to 
its IP address. These subdomains have the same authoritative TTL value 
as the main domain, and we can use as many as we need. We also had to 
enable the cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) (Lekies et al., 2011) of a 
PHP file at the server that will be requested using the various sub-
domains to use only one physical server to allocate the web service for 
various URLs. 
To determine whether a DNS resolution time corresponds to a DNS 
query to a local DNS server or not, we must define thresholds that 
depend on the operating systems and the resolution times that are listed 
at Tables 4 and 6. We will also consider that a DNS query that is resolved 
by a local DNS server can be as little as 0.4 ms, as we have observed from 
users using our tool. 
For macOS, the resolution times of queries that are solved by the 
operating system’s cache and the browser’s cache are always much 
shorter than the resolution times of queries that are solved by local DNS 
servers (Fig. 13c); hence, any DNS answer with a response time that 
exceeds TholdM = 0.4 ms is regarded as solved by a local DNS server, 
namely, there is no possibility of obtaining false-positive or false- 
negative results. 
When using Android systems, the access to the browser’s DNS cache 
takes longer than in macOS systems. Accessing the browser’s DNS cache 
can take between 0.1 ms and 1.4 ms (Fig. 13b). From Figs. 12b and 0.6% 
of the queries that were solved by the browser’s cache had a resolution 
time that exceeded TholdA = 0.7 ms, and we never obtained two 
consecutive times that exceeded TholdA in the same test. This means that 
our approach will be based in getting two resolution times greater than 
TholdA (samples 6 and 12 from Fig. 10) to identify that both requests are 
answered by a local server and therefore that the TTL is being manip-
ulated. Since 7.31% of the local DNS resolution times are below 
TholdA(Fig. 13b), some of the cases in which ISPs are reducing the TTL of 
DNS responses could be undetected (false negatives), however, we have 
considered more important to be certain of any positive detected. TholdA 
= 0.7 ms is selected to obtain zero false positives and a low rate of false 
negatives. For the statistics we present in section 6, even if the test from 
a user reports a false negative, it can be corrected by another user 
completing the test from the same ISP. 
For Windows, the response time values from the operating system 
DNS cache overlap substantially with the local DNS server response 
times; hence, detection in Windows devices is more difficult than for 
Android or macOS devices. We define two thresholds when using Win-
dow devices, TholdWL = 1 ms and T_TholdWH = 3.7 ms. Both thresholds are 
selected to minimize the number of false positives at the expense of 
getting some false negatives. Resolution times from the OS cache never 
exceed TholdWH, and they only exceed TholdWL in 27.5% of the cases. This 
27.5% can be reduced to 8.05% if we require two consecutive samples to 
exceed the threshold. Resolution times from the local DNS server below 
TholdWL are 19.21% of the cases and they get reduced significantively if 
we require two consecutive samples to not exceed this threshold. 
Following this analysis, the proposed algorithm is the following: a DNS 
response time that exceeds TholdWH is considered to correspond to a query 
that is solved by a local DNS server. A DNS response time that is between 
TholdWL and TholdWH is not conclusive, and more samples are needed. 
Finally, a response time that is below TholdWL is considered to correspond 
to a query that is solved by the OS cache and if erroneous (false negative) 
it can be improved with more samples. The algorithm is described in 
more detail using s flowchart in the next section. 
5.2. Flow diagram of the tool 
The proposed web tool is organized into two phases: In the first 
phase, a validation is conducted in which the service confirms that the 
user is using macOS, Windows or Android and is using Google Chrome 
browser. Once this has been validated, the user is able to start the test. If 
the user starts the test, the tool stores in a database information about its 
IP address, ISP, HTTP-user agent, assigned subdomain and timestamp of 
Fig. 14. Flowchart of the algorithm for checking DNS behaviour.  
T. Hernandez-Quintanilla et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Journal of Network and Computer Applications 176 (2021) 102941
13
the first time a resource is requested. This information will be used for 
classifying the results, but it is not necessary for the tool to operate. The 
IP address of each client enables the identification of the autonomous 
system using the WHOIS service and, therefore, of the ISP of the user, in 
addition to the country, region name and city name. The User-Agent is 
an option in the HTTP header and provides information on the type of 
web browser and the operating system of the client. 
In the second phase, a target random subdomain is polled every 
polling interval to obtain a profile of the DNS response times that are 
obtained by the client and to deduce the DNS behaviour. A polling in-
terval of 10 s is selected because it enables several samples to be ob-
tained before the cache of typical browsers expires (1 min), and the 
duration of the test is equivalent to the authoritative TTL value of the 
target subdomain. An authoritative TTL of 180 s enables 18 samples to 
be obtained and enables an identification that is similar to that proposed 
in Section 4.1. Due to miscalibrations in the JavaScript timeouts, the 
exact samples where the local DNS server responses occur may be 
shifted. To correct this error, we analyse the samples according to their 
sequence numbers, namely, from 6 to 10 and from 11 to 15. This will not 
alter the results as the thresholds always exceed the values of the 
browser DNS cache resolution times. 
Fig. 14 illustrates the algorithm that is used to analyse each of the 
DNS resolution times that we obtain during the test. In this diagram, the 
operating system is represented as the variable Osys, the obtained DNS 
response time as tres, and the four thresholds as TholdM for macOS systems, 
TholdA for Android systems and TholdWL and TholdWH for Windows systems 
(lower and upper thresholds respectively). The values of these thresh-
olds were described in the previous section. The number of the request 
that is being analysed is stored in a variable, namely, Nreq. The number 
of request with response times between TholdWL and TholdWH is stored in 
variable Nlocal2, and the number of requests that exceed any of the other 
thresholds are stored in variable Nlocal1. The variable Rtest indicates the 
number of times the test has already been completed in the same session, 
and it is used in windows devices when obtained samples are not reliable 
enough to make a decision. In that case, Rtest is incremented by one and 
the test is repeated again. The variables Nreq, Nlocal1, Nlocal2 and Rtest have 
an initial value of 0. 
According to Fig. 14, the test requires 16 samples of DNS response 
times to determine whether the user’s ISP is modifying the TTL of DNS 
answers; hence, the test is 160 s long. Once the result has been extracted, 
the user is notified whether its ISP is modifying the TTL of DNS answers 
or not. If the result indicates that the test should be repeated, a new test 
will start, and once it has been completed, the result will be communi-
cated to the user. 
With a polling interval of 10 s and a total measuring time of 180 s, we 
capture 18 DNS response times. With a typical browser cache of 60 s and 
an OS level cache, we would obtain 15 DNS resolution times that are 
related to the browser DNS cache and 1 DNS resolution time that is 
related to the authoritative DNS server. The 2 remaining DNS response 
times correspond to the OS DNS cache in the normal scenario (Figs. 6–9) 
or to the local DNS server in the privacy-compromised scenario (if the 
TTL is changed to a value that is less than the browser cache; see Fig. 10). 
If only 1 DNS response time is obtained for each later source (which is a 
very rare scenario that is mainly caused by problems in the client PC), 
the test is conducted for an additional 1 or 2 min with a new random 
domain. Depending on the new sample, the final decision is made. It is 
necessary to obtain 2 consecutive samples with times that are related to 
the OS DNS cache or the local DNS server cache. The test can finish after 
obtaining 2 DNS resolution times that differ from the browser DNS cache 
source. In approximately 160 s, it is possible to identify the scenario in 
most cases. 
For clients without an OS DNS cache, such as Android, the browser 
cache follows the value of the TTL that was obtained from the local DNS 
server. In a normal scenario, the local DNS server maintains the 
authoritative DNS TTL; therefore, the tool will obtain 17 DNS response 
times that are related to the browser DNS cache and 1 that is related to 
the authoritative DNS server. However, in a privacy-compromised sce-
nario, if the authoritative DNS TTL is changed to a value that is less than 
the browser cache time, there will be 15 DNS response times related to 
the browser DNS cache, 2 that are related to the local DNS server and 1 
that is related to the authoritative DNS server. 
In summary, with a polling interval of 10 s and a total measuring 
time of 160 s, we capture 16 DNS response times. In the privacy- 
compromised scenario (with or without an OS cache), there must be 2 
DNS response times that correspond to the local DNS server cache as the 
source. This is the final decision that the tool must make. 
In the graphic interface of the tool, during the test, users can view 
two charts that display the DNS resolution times they are obtaining in 
real time, along with a log with the DNS response times that are obtained 
and the time at which the request for the loaded resource was 
completed. The users can also compare their results with the results that 
are obtained by other users from the same or different ISPs. The web-
page has also a section with information about how the test is conducted 
and its objective so that non-expert Internet users can understand and 
interpret the results. The tool2 is publicly available, and over a thousand 
unique users have used the tool. 
6. Detected cases of ISPs manipulating the TTL in DNS responses 
Fig. 15 illustrates the percentage of users of each ISP whose privacy 
Fig. 15. Percentages of users whose privacy is being compromised by an ISP, 
which are classified by the environment (mobile or desktop). Fig. 16. Percentages of Internet users who conducted the privacy test, divided 
by ISPs. 
2 The source code is available at https://github.com/grsst-upna/DNSPriv 
acyTester. 
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we have detected, using DNSPrivacyTester tool, to be compromised. 
They are classified by the type of environment (mobile/desktop). Large 
differences have been observed between mobile (Android) and desktop 
(Windows and macOS); hence, the data are presented separately for 
each environment. The four most important Spanish ISPs are repre-
sented in the Figure as ISP1, ISP2, ISP3 and ISP4, and all the other ISPs, 
about which we collected data, are represented together as Others. The 
represented data are obtained from the analysis of more than ten 
thousand tests by more than one thousand users that were conducted 
during August and September of 2019. 
As shown in Fig. 15, all ISPs have a percentage of users whose pri-
vacy is being compromised; hence, currently, the TTL modification is 
not used in the whole network of each provider. ISPs seem to apply the 
technique of reducing the TTL of DNS responses in mobile environments 
more often than in desktop environments, but we should also consider 
that it is easier to detect a user whose privacy is being compromised 
when the test is conducted by a mobile device (lower percentage of false 
negatives). 
Fig. 16 presents the percentage of the performed tests that corre-
sponds to each of the ISPs that were studied. Most of the tests were 
conducted by Internet users of ISP1, ISP2, ISP3 and ISP4, while other 
ISPs (over 80 ISPs) only cover 16.98% of the Internet users that con-
ducted the tests. 
According to Section 4.2, there were cases in which we could not 
determine whether an ISP was modifying the TTL or not, due to the large 
values that were obtained for the DNS resolution times when accessing 
the operating system cache in Windows and the browser cache in 
Android systems. Table 7 presents the results that we obtained for each 
platform. This table was constructed by applying the algorithm that we 
designed to the samples that were obtained during the tests. According 
to Table 6, the percentage of false positives that were obtained is 0%, as 
our system is designed to prevent false-positive results. The ground truth 
is obtained by considering all samples from each user and not only the 
first 160 s. The number of false-negative results is only 6.30%. The 
explanation is that to reduce the number of false-positive results, the 
number of false negative results must be increased via the use of higher 
thresholds if the number of tests that are performed is not increased. 
In total, according to the percentage of positive results that were 
obtained, a total of 10.89% of users are having their privacy compro-
mised by their ISPs through the DNS service. It is expected that in the 
near future, this percentage will increase because this technique is one of 
the inexpensive options to characterize user behaviour when the per-
centage of encrypted traffic increases. 
7. Related work 
Many systems that use active probing to infer the popularity of a 
domain have been proposed (Wills et al., 2003; Rajab et al., 2008; Ma 
et al., 2015). These methods require the recursive query of DNS servers 
regarding domains. Through commands such as dig or nslookup, a 
program can collect information on the last time someone accessed a 
domain. These methods do not affect the DNS records that are stored in 
the server’s cache but retrieve accurate information about the resources 
its users are querying. However, the performance of these methods in 
estimating the popularity of a domain is limited by the authoritative TTL 
that is set for the DNS record by its owner (Wills et al., 2003). If ISPs set a 
low and constant TTL for all resolved domains, the accuracy of these 
methods would be improved, as clients would query their DNS servers 
more frequently and more uniformly, thereby facilitating the collection 
and processing of DNS information. Systems that rely on the passive 
analysis of packets that are captured in DNS resolvers, such as those 
described in (García-Dorado et al., 2018; Kim and Zhang, 2015), would 
also benefit from a reduction of the TTL of DNS answers. These studies 
focus on inferring the user behaviour and the popularity of web pages, 
but they do not test the DNS conditions of Internet users or examine how 
their privacy is compromised by ISPs, although they assume that ISPs do 
not change TTL values. 
The system that is described in (García-Dorado et al., 2018) detects 
which websites a user has accessed. When a user enters a webpage, 
several DNS queries with various TTLs are triggered, and it weighs the 
importance of each one based on the TTL and popularity. A low and 
uniform TTL for all DNS records would render the system more accurate 
and simpler as the importance of a DNS response could be established 
based only on the popularity of the domain. In (Kim and Zhang, 2015), 
the system detects the most visited domains by a user by constructing 
sets of the most queried DNS records by the user. A low and uniform TTL 
would not only increase the amount of information they collect but also 
put all domains under equal conditions for inclusion in the set of the 
most visited domains, thereby improving substantially the accuracy of 
the system. 
In the case of a tracking system such as that described in (Herrmann 
et al., 2013), the analysis is based on examining DNS requests that are 
resolved by DNS servers and tracking Internet users based on their be-
haviours. Increasing the number of queries that are made by each client 
would facilitate the tracking of these users and render the obtained re-
sults more accurate, thereby reducing their anonymity. 
It has been reported that there are malicious open DNS servers that 
change the DNS responses to redirect users to custom destinations 
(Trevisan et al., 2017) and that some open DNS resolvers increase the 
TTL value of DNS responses to reduce servers load (Kührer et al., 2015). 
However, we have not been able to find any study that reported and 
effectively demonstrated the existence of ISPs that manipulate DNS re-
sponses to increase the collection of information about their clients. 
Another study (Liu et al., 2018) suggests a method for identifying DNS 
resolvers that are intercepting DNS queries that are made by Internet 
clients, but it does not provide information about DNS manipulations 
that are conducted by legitimate DNS resolvers. Reference (Pearce et al., 
2017) describes a method for measuring DNS manipulation at a global 
scale, but it does not provide a method that could be used by regular 
Internet users to check whether their ISP is manipulating the DNS ser-
vice or not. Our tool, namely, DNSPrivacyTester, requires direct but 
simple action from Internet users and estimates DNS manipulation from 
a client-side perspective, which enables us to collect information about 
manipulations by ISP DNS servers that could not be collected by any 
other tool. 
DNS has been reported to be the most vulnerable Internet service 
nowadays, and ISPs have little interest in implementing measurements 
that enhance their users’ privacy (Lee, 2019; Hunter, 2019; Brodkin, 
2019). There are many solutions that Internet users can implement to 
secure their DNS information, such as DNS over TLS (DoT), DNS over 
Table 7 
Results that were obtained, which are separated by environment and into pos-
itive (privacy-compromised), false-positive, false-negative and negative (privacy 
not compromised) results.   
Environment Total 
Mobile Desktop 
Positive 25.00% 3.11% 10.89% 
False Positive 0% 0% 0% 
False Negative 0.54% 9.48% 6.30% 
Negative 74.46% 87.41% 82.81%  
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HTTPS (DoH) and DNSSEC; however, their use is mostly anecdotal 
(Osterweil et al., 2007; Szalachowski and Perrig, 2017; Lu et al., 2019; 
Lian et al., 2013), although most OSs and applications allow the 
implementation of DNS encryption (Dickinson, 2020). The problem is 
that regular Internet users are unaware of the importance of their pri-
vacy, and in most cases, they do not know how to implement methods to 
protect it. 
8. Conclusions 
We have presented a strategy for determining whether the DNS 
service is being manipulated by ISPs to collect browsing data on their 
subscribers. The study focused on the effectiveness of reducing the TTL 
of the DNS responses and the factors that can affect the amount and 
quality of the data that are collected via this technique. We have ana-
lysed the DNS record sources that an application may access when it 
wants to retrieve DNS information about a domain and how they affect 
the amount of data that the ISP may obtain. 
We have analysed the impact that the use of this technique of 
reducing the TTL values of DNS responses can have in the current 
Internet scenario. We have addressed the consequences of the use of this 
technique, with an emphasis on the privacy concerns it raises. Finally, 
we have developed a public tool that can help all Internet users 
(regardless of their knowledge about Internet protocols) check if their 
ISPs are compromising their privacy via this technique. The results reach 
0% of false positives for privacy-compromised scenario, and 6.30% of 
false negatives that can be reduced with a longer measurement time. 
According to the results that were obtained from users, the technique 
of reducing the TTL value of DNS answers is currently being used at 
various levels by large ISPs, thereby supporting the privacy concerns of 
Internet users. 
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